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We introduce a simple class of distribution networks which withstand damage by being repairable
instead of redundant. We prove a lower bound for the expected cost of repair, and show that for
networks on the square and triangular lattice, this bound is achievable and results in a network with
exactly three levels of structural hierarchy. We extend our results to networks subject to repeated
attacks, in which the repairs themselves must be repairable. We find that, in exchange for a modest
increase in repair cost, such networks are able to withstand any number of attacks.
PACS numbers: 84.40.Ua, 84.30.Jc, 89.40.Cc
Increasing the resilience of infrastructure networks to
natural and man-made disasters is a topic of the high-
est political concern [1]. In recent years we have wit-
nessed the devastating impact of both natural calamities
(tsunamis, hurricanes and earthquakes) and man-made
threats (sabotage, accidents). The human loss is exacer-
bated by the collapse of distribution networks (power and
water), communication grids (cellular and www) and
transport networks (road and rail) [2], even though the
fraction of each network that is damaged may be small.
To safeguard against the threat of disasters, many re-
searchers and funding agencies have focused on robust-
ness, whereby damage is absorbed due to internal re-
dundancy. Robustness tends to be the strategy adopted
by biological networks, such as the circulatory and ner-
vous systems and leaf venation [3], which also must func-
tion reliably under environmental insults [4]. Robustness,
however, is not the only strategy for increasing resilience.
In a recent announcement, the EU science agency ap-
pealed for “resilience concepts [that] take into account
the necessity to anticipate, plan and implement a substi-
tution process in a crisis or disaster, aiming to deal with
a lack of. . . capacities necessary to assume the continuity
of basic functions and services, until recovery from nega-
tive effects and return to the normal situation” [5]. This
“substitution process,” or workaround, involves finding a
short-term fix until the damaged part itself can be re-
paired. When the typical cost of a workaround (averaged
over all possible failure modes) is low, we say that the
system is repairable. Repairability in this sense is the
subject of this Letter.
For concreteness, we define the two resilience strategies
thus: A network is robust if, after an error in part of it, it
is able (or more likely) to function normally on account
of internal redundancy. A network is repairable if, after
an error in part of it, it is able (or more likely) to function
normally on account of intervention in other parts of it.
Before we consider network resilience, we briefly out-
line optimal infrastructure networks. The simplest mod-
els take connectivity to be the sole determinant of func-
tion. Such models are appropriate for certain networks
under light load, such as roads, electricity supply [6] and
communication networks [7]. Here the network cost typ-
ically grows with the total length of the edges, and op-
timal solutions in a constant environment are minimal
spanning trees [6]. As a network becomes more heavily
used, connectivity alone is no longer sufficient, and the
capacity of the edges must also be considered. For mod-
els derived from resistor networks, efficiency translates to
minimum power dissipation. If one associates a cost R−γ
with each resistance R and specifies a total cost, then
for planar networks with γ < 1, loopless geometries are
known to be optimal [8, 9]. More generally, this approach
provides an explanation for fractal branching networks in
biology, and ultimately for allometric growth laws [10].
So much for optimal networks in a static environment.
In the presence of unexpected events, the traditional ap-
proach to maintaining function is the introduction of re-
dundancy (localized, such as extra paths from source to
sink, or distributed, such as checksums in digital data).
For models of the internet, where simple connectivity suf-
fices, the exponent of the distribution of node degrees [11]
is the key parameter, both for random [12] and directed
[13] attacks. For planar resistor networks with γ < 1 suf-
fering local damage or under fluctuating loads, the de-
signs that emerge from numerical optimization have a
hierarchical loop structure over many length scales [3].
The above work has focused on network robustness,
whereas we want to understand network repairability. In
doing so, we wish to capture the constraints on real in-
frastructure networks, in particular the cost of capacity
rather than just connectivity. Resistor networks account
for this in a natural way, but have the disadvantage that
analytic results are hard to obtain. We therefore propose
a model of intermediate complexity, where the required
capacity of each edge is proportional to the number of
downstream nodes it has to serve. An example of such a
model is shown in Figure 1b, where houses are supplied
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2with water from a central tower. This model captures es-
sential features of networks under non-trivial loads, but
is sufficiently tractable to solve interesting cases exactly.
In this Letter, we do the following three things, each
of which corresponds to a separate section:
1. We introduce a model of repairable networks in which
a break at edge i can be mitigated by adding an edge
at j, and show that the cost of repair is the flux at i
times the length, less 1, of the loop through i and j.
2. We introduce the concept of an easily repairable net-
work (ern), which minimizes the expected cost of re-
pair 〈c〉 after a single attack. We prove that erns have
exactly three levels of structural hierarchy.
3. When attacks are sufficiently numerous to strike the
same place repeatedly, the repairs themselves must be
easily repairable. To address this, we describe steady-
state erns, able to withstand any number of attacks
in exchange for a modest increase in 〈c〉.
Model of repairable networks.— For some systems, mis-
takes are reversible: the unintended change can be re-
verted or the broken part can be replaced like-for-like
(an on-screen typo; a dropped pen; a flat tire). More of-
ten than not, however, the error is irreversible or the
repair time is unacceptably long (a printed typo; a miss-
ing ingredient; a jet engine failure). In these cases, it is
necessary to find a workaraound; that is, to restore the
broken part by intervening in other parts.
As a model of the latter, suppose we need to continu-
ously transport a commodity or information from a single
source to a collection of N nodes, each of which consumes
the substance at a unit rate. We imagine that the source
and N nodes form the vertices of an underlying lattice L,
which we take to be either square (L, illustrated in Fig-
ure 1), or triangular with a hexagonal boundary (L4).
We assume the diameter is l nodes, where l is odd. The
total number of vertices is l2 (L) or 34 (l
2−1)+1 (L4), so
that N = l2−1 and N4 = 34 (l2−1). The bonds of L are
the possible conduits for transport, but not all of these
bonds will be used in practice. The ones that are we call
edges, and the ones that are not passive edges. Each edge
i carries a signed flux Ji, such that the flux leaving the
source is N , and the net flux into each of the N nodes is
1. We assume (without loss of generality, as we shall see
later) that the network of edges is a tree T (Figure 1b).
This loop-free property allows us to assign fluxes on T
unambiguously (Figure 1c). It also means there must be
N edges, because into each node flows exactly one edge.
We now consider what happens when the network is
broken and then repaired. In our model, a break consists
of disabling a single edge i (i.e., edge i becomes passive;
passive edges have zero flux), which disconnects the tree
T into two disjoint trees (Figure 1d). We then proceed
to repair the network by adding an edge j 6= i such that
the new network is once more a tree, with a new set of
fluxes {J′i} (Figure 2e). We define the cost (intervention
required) cij from this break-repair operation as the sum
of the absolute changes in flux, but omitting the flux in
the broken edge (we do not pay for the attack):
cij = −|Ji|+
∑
k an edge
|J′k − Jk|, (1)
This makes sense: if we imagine a fluid to flow along
small unit flux pipes in parallel, or cars to travel along
unit flux lanes of a highway, c is the number of pipes or
lanes to add or remove (where reversing involves adding
and removing). Note in particular that we pay if capacity
is reduced; this is a valid strategy if there is an ongoing
maintenance cost attached to the capacity of each edge
(e.g., metabolism in biological tissues), so that it is ratio-
nal to pay up-front to eliminate this. This is the natural
choice from a mathematical perspective, but may not al-
ways be physically realistic. We thus consider the alter-
native model where spare capacity is free; here the costs
turn out to be proportional our original model solutions.
In order to evaluate cij , suppose we have any two valid
networks T ′ and T ′′ with the same source location. If we
subtract the fluxes in T ′′ from those in T ′, the resultant
pattern of fluxes must have no sources or sinks. Therefore
it must either vanish, or be a sum of closed flux loops.
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FIG. 1: A distribution network, and the process of dam-
age and repair. b. Each house requires one unit of water per
day from a tower. The flux into each house is equal to the
number of houses downstream from it, plus one. Each day a
random pipe breaks, and a new pipe must be built elsewhere
to reconnect the cut off houses. Moreover, some of the pipes
upstream and downstream from the new pipe must be resized
to accommodate the change in demand. What network mini-
mizes the expected total change in flux, and thus pipe altered,
per break? a. The source, nodes and bonds (possible edges).
b. The tree of edges connecting the nodes to the source. c.
The fluxes Ji at each edge. d. An edge is broken, splitting the
tree in two. e. A new bond is made an edge, reconnecting the
subtrees, and the updated fluxes J′i. f. The changes in fluxes
|J′i−Ji|. They vanish everywhere except on the loop through
the broken and repairing edges. The cost of repair is the flux
through the broken edge times the remaining loop length: c
= 5 · (8-1) = 35.
3Now consider our original network T . If we make a new
network containing the original edges of T and the added
edge k, this network is no longer a tree, but contains ex-
actly one loop, of length dij . When we take the difference
of the fluxes in the original and repaired networks, this is
the only path which can have a non-zero flux (Figure 1f),
which must be the original flux at i (since after repair,
the flux in this edge is zero). Consequently, the cost of
repair is equal to the length of the loop through i and j
less 1 (we omit the broken edge), times the flux at i:
cij = Ji(dij − 1), (2)
where Ji = |Ji|. Now a broken network can be mended
in a number of ways, corresponding to different choices
of the bond j used to repair it. We desire the cheapest
repair, which is the one with the least cost:
ci = Ji min
j
(dij − 1). (3)
Hereafter we take ‘repair’ to mean ‘cheapest repair’, and
call the loop that arises from considering both the broken
edge and the repair a dormant loop. Because the cost of
repair ci depends on the particular edge i that is broken,
which is unknown, we want the expected cost of repair:
〈c〉 = 1
N
∑
i an edge
Ji min
j
(dij − 1). (4)
What network minimizes 〈c〉? Figure 2 shows some ex-
amples of networks, with associated values for 〈c〉.
Easily repairable after one break.— The expected cost of
repair 〈c〉 will be a minimum if two conditions are sat-
isfied: the mean absolute flux 〈J〉 ≡ N−1∑ Ji in the
original network is a minimum; and all the individual
shortest loop lengths dij are minimal. Without knowing
to what extent these conditions are independent, we first
ask: what networks minimize 〈J〉? To answer this, we note
that every node must be connected to the source by some
path, and along this path flows a unit of flux. There may
Pinwheel, 〈c〉 = 7.0Web, 〈c〉 = 33.2Snowflake, 〈c〉 = 6.0Snake, 〈c〉 = 129.8
Spiral, 〈c〉 = 46.2 Comb, 〈c〉 = 12.8 Antenna, 〈c〉 = 11.7 Staircase, 〈c〉 = 12.2
FIG. 2: Different strategies for building a distribution net-
work and their expected cost of repair 〈c〉. Top: square lattice.
Bottom: triangular lattice.
also be confluent fluxes to other nodes flowing in the same
edges, but we can conceptually treat this flux separately,
even if in practice we do not keep track of all the individ-
ual streams. Accordingly the mean flux 〈J〉 is 1/N times
the sum of the lengths of all these streams. Therefore a
minimum of 〈J〉 is achieved when each of these paths is
a geodesic (shortest path) of the graph L between the
node and the source. Such geodesics in general will not
be unique, but at least one network composed of these
geodesics must be a tree, because any loop can be bro-
ken by removing an edge at its greatest distance from the
source and diverting the incoming streams into one side
of this loop. If the source is at the center of the lattice,
we find 〈J〉min = l/2 for a square lattice (L) and l/3 for
a triangular lattice (L4). Since the minimum loop length
dij on L and L4 is 4 and 3, we find
〈c〉 ≥ 3l/2 and 〈c〉4 ≥ 2l/3. (5)
Because both of these criteria can be met simultane-
ously, as Figure 3 exemplifies, the above bounds can be
achieved. We call the solutions, which are not unique,
easily repairable networks (erns).
We now consider the case where we do not have to pay
to immediately reduce capacity. For an ern on L4, the
expected cost of repair is identical in both cases, because
none of the fluxes change direction, and we do not pay
for the break itself.
The structure of erns on regular lattices is remark-
able in that they have exactly three levels of hierar-
chy: connected to the source are primary arms (1-arms),
from which branch secondary arms (2-arms), from which
branch terminal hairs of length 1 (3-arms). In this sense
erns loosely resemble crinoids: marine animals with cilia-
covered arms connected to a primary stalk. The architec-
ture of erns is in contrast to robust resistor networks,
a. Original network b. Independent dormant loops
FIG. 3: Networks that are easy to repair after one break. The
original networks (left) and the configuration of overlapping
dormant loops (right).
4which have a hierarchical branching structure over many
generations [3]. The steps to our proof of this limited hi-
erarchy are as follows. (i) A 1-arm must lie along a coor-
dinate axis; were it otherwise, the path to at least one of
the nodes on that axis would include a bend and not be a
geodesic. (ii) When a 2-arm splits, there can be only two
daughter branches (including the 2-arm); there are only
two directions that are geodesic, namely, the two away
from the origin. (iii) In any 2-arm split, the two daughter
nodes cannot both split; if they did, a closed loop would
be formed. (iv) The middle node of two consecutive edges
must have a split; were it otherwise, the distal edge could
not be part of a dormant loop of minimal size.
Easily repairable after many breaks.— So far we have de-
scribed networks that are easily repairable after a single
break. What happens when there is a series of breaks? As
we indicated in the introduction, we suppose that a break
cannot be repaired immediately but is open to interven-
tion later on (for example, if there there is another attack
in the neighborhood). Clearly, repairing the first break
(at an expected cost of 3l/2 or 2l/3) leaves the network
fully functional. However, there is a more subtle effect:
the repairs themselves may not be optimally repairable.
Consequently, as the number of breaks increases, the net-
work degrades, and the mean cost of repair 〈c〉 goes up.
How do we rectify this? The structure of an ern is
such that (i) it is geodesic, thereby minimizing 〈J〉; and
(ii) each of its edges is part of a minimal dormant loop,
thereby minimizing d. Network degradation is due to two
effects: the failure of the repaired network to be geodesic;
and the increase in dormant loop length. The former is
because the edges in a minimal latent loop can have only
4 (L) or 3 (L4) orientations, and not all of these are
geodesic; since repair is performed on the only passive
a. Original network b. After many breaks c. Independent dormant loops
FIG. 4: Networks that are easy to repair after many breaks.
The original networks (left), the networks after many break
and repair cycles (center), and the configuration of indepen-
dent dormant loops (right).
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FIG. 5: The three orientations of a dormant loop. The left
orientation is geodesic (the flux follows the shortest path to
each node), whereas the other two are not. Each break and re-
pair sends the dormant loop from one orientation to another.
The total flux along the geodesic dormant loop is a+ b. After
many break-repair cycles, when the orientations are equally
likely, the mean total flux is 4
3
(a + b). Thus at steady state,
the mean flux 〈J(∞)〉 is 4/3 of that before any breaks, 〈J(0)〉.
edge, eventually the orientations will occur with equal
frequency. The latter is the result of dormant loops that
share an edge; and when an edge belonging to two dor-
mant loops is broken, repairing it coalesces the two loops
into one larger dormant loop. Therefore to optimize net-
works for cheap repair under multiple breaks, we must
ensure that the dormant loops are independent, having
no edges in common. Figure 4 shows that for a triangular
lattice, this can be achieved; for the square lattice, there
will always be at least a small fraction of dormant loops
sharing an edge, and in fact these dominate the change
in 〈c〉 after many breaks. Figure 5 shows the calculation
for the average repair cost per break after many breaks.
The final result in the many-break limit is
〈c〉 → 7l/4 +O(1) and 〈c〉4 → 8l/9. (6)
Thus in both cases, the networks are able to withstand
any number of breaks in exchange for a modest increase
in the expected repair cost. We call the solutions steady-
state erns. Their design aims to achieve three properties
(all being simultaneously possible for the triangular lat-
tice): (i) the initial network is geodesic; (ii) the dormant
loops are minimal; (iii) the dormant loops do not overlap.
We briefly consider the case where we do not have to
pay to immediately reduce capacity. Analysis for L4 sim-
ilar to that in Figure 5 (but now involving 6 possible
states) reveals that steady-state erns have an asymp-
totic expected cost 〈c〉4 → 5l/9.
Discussion.— There are two aspects of repairability we
have not addressed so far. If the edges are not all of equal
length, we can generalize our model by letting dij be the
physical length of the loop, not just the number of edges
it contains. Then our model would encompass networks
whose underlying lattice is irregular. For small pertur-
bations from the regular lattice L there will be no new
solutions (since moving away from a solution that is op-
timal on L incurs a cost of order unity); however, the
perturbation is likely to break the degeneracy between
different optimal solutions on the original L. We also con-
jecture that it is possible to optimize networks which are
repairable to damage across multiple length scales, which
5may involve the presence of minimal dormant loops of dif-
ferent sizes, e.g., on the network coarse-grained by 2× 2,
4× 4 and so on.
We believe our model of distribution networks captures
essential features of their real-world analogs, in a form
which is simple enough to be analytically tractable. It
suggests that the structure of erns and steady-state erns
embodies useful design directions for engineering appli-
cations, such as resource distribution, smart electricity
grids [14] and communication networks. More generally,
it helps quantify the concept of repairability, and offers a
framework for extending our understanding of repairabil-
ity as an alternative to robustness in achieving resilience.
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